Useful Adversaries by Thomas J. Christensen;

Author:Thomas J. Christensen;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2020-06-15T00:00:00+00:00

Mao’s Risk Analysis

Contrary to the threat-based accounts discussed above, an October 2 telegram to Stalin found in the Chinese archival collections demonstrates that Mao fully considered the possibility of an American declaration of war and bombardment of “many major cities and industrial targets” in China (see Appendix B). Mao did not discuss atomic weapons, but he clearly envisioned massive conventional strategic bombing.91 Mansourov’s study of Russian documents portrays a CCP even more concerned with the threat of an American declaration of war than the Chinese documents reveal. In the Russian version of Mao’s October 2 message to Stalin, Mao reveals that Central Committee members believed that China should not enter the war in Korea because open warfare with the United States would delay China’s economic development and create popular discontent. Mansourov argues that in the early days of October Stalin failed to convince the CCP that Chinese entrance into Korea was wise. Stalin used two arguments for this purpose: first, he argued that the United States was not ready for a world war, so China need not fear that America would launch a direct attack on a Soviet ally; second, if America was indeed ready for a world war, 1950 was the best time for the communist bloc to fight such a war. In Mansourov’s account, the final decision by Mao and the Central Committee to enter the war was not driven by Stalin’s reassurances but by the fear engendered by American forces crossing the parallel on October 7 and by Stalin’s clever threat to acquiesce fully to American domination of Korea if China did not send in ground troops.92 While the discrepancies between the Russian and Chinese versions of events on October 2 and October 3 remain an interesting puzzle, the Russian account supports strongly the argument that Mao and the CCP Politburo entered the Korean War fully aware of the threat of American retaliation against the Chinese mainland.

Some scholars suggest that Mao’s statements to Stalin about American bombing and declaration of war may have been a ploy to get the Soviets more involved in Korea by triggering the Sino-Soviet defense treaty.93 But other evidence demonstrates that Mao’s stated fears were sincere. Peng Dehuai reports that he and Mao discussed the threat of American bombing with the Chinese Politburo and that Peng had prepared Chinese forces for such an eventuality.94 Beijing’s fear of American bombing never diminished in the first months of U.S. operations. On November 22, two days before MacArthur’s final drive north, the Central Military Commission warned South China forces that American pilots flying under the guise of Chiang’s air force might make bombing runs against Chinese targets.95

Mao had every reason to believe that America would launch such an attack. Declassified American documents show that the State Department plotted a “calculated indiscretion” by the American ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, stating that if China attacked in Korea or the Taiwan Straits “the United States will consider itself at war, and not only deal with such Chinese forces as may be met in the field but also strike at the bases of Chinese power.

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